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We extend Harris and Zhao (2007) by proposing a (Panel) Inflated Ordered Probit
model, and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to Bank of England Monetary
Policy Committee voting data.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Harris and Zhao (2007) propose a Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit (ZIOP)
model to take into account an ‘inflated’ number of observations at one end of an ordered
choice spectrum.1 However, in other applied situations, an excess number of observations
may occur elsewhere. For instance, Fabiani et al. (2006) find that European manufacturing
firms overwhelmingly leave prices unchanged rather than raise or lower them; similarly,
Harris and Spencer (2009) find that Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
members vote significantly more often to leave interest rates unchanged instead of reducing
or increasing them. In both cases the choices faced by firms and MPC members can be
construed as having a clear implicit ordering: reduce, leave unchanged, increase, such that
the middle outcome, and not an outcome at one end of the choice spectrum, is ‘inflated’. In
light of these examples, we propose an econometric model that has applications in panel or
cross-sectional settings, where the choice spectrum is dominated by one particular outcome,
irrespective of its position in the ordering. Our model is applied to policy rate votes cast by
Bank of England MPC members, and captures voting behavior well.
2 Model
Assume that the choice set is characterized by three ordered outcomes - 0 1 2 - where the
middle outcome represents the ‘inflated’ category. Generalizations to situations with more
outcomes and/or inflation in other categories are obvious. The formal starting point is an
underlying latent variable, ∗ for unit , in period  which is a linear in parameters (β)
function of a vector of observed characteristics x and a random error  This latent binary
variable represents an overall propensity to choose the inflated category over any other,
∗ = x
0
β +  (1)
This represents a panel indexed model;  would be omitted for a cross-sectional one. Label
expression (1) the splitting equation (SE). (1) states that unit  has an overall augmented
propensity to choose the inflated outcome over all others. We propose a two-regime scenario
such that for units in regime  = 0 the inflated outcome is observed; but for those in
 = 1 we may witness any of the possible outcomes in the choice set {0 1 2}. Membership
of either regime ( = 0  = 1) is never observed and is identified by data.
For units in regime  = 1, an underlying latent variable 
∗
 is specified as a linear in
1The term ‘inflated’ is not related to the phenomenon of rising prices, but the fact that the overwhelming
majority of empirical observations fall into one particular choice category, which hence appears ‘inflated’.
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parameters function of a vector of observed characteristics z, with unknown weights γ and
a random disturbance term ,
∗ = z
0
γ +  (2)
For these units, outcome probabilities are determined by an ordered probit (OP) model.
Assuming joint normality of  and , final outcome probabilities are given by
Pr() =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
Pr ( = 0 |zx ) = Φ2 (x0β−z0γ;−)
Pr ( = 1 |zx ) = [1−Φ (x0β)] + {Φ2 (x0β − z0γ;−)−Φ2 (x0β−z0γ;−)}
Pr ( = 2 |zx ) = Φ2 (x0β z0γ − ; )
(3)
where Φ2 (; ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standardized bivariate
normal distribution with correlation coefficient , and  represents the usual OP boundary
parameter(s). In this way, the probability of outcome 1 has been ‘inflated’: to observe  = 1
requires either that  = 0; or jointly that  = 1 and that 0  
∗
 ≤ . Observationally
equivalent category 1 outcomes, can hence arise from two distinct sources. We term this new
econometric model a (Panel) Inflated Ordered Probit (PIOP) model. The estimated probabili-
ties in equation (3) are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function  (θ) with respect




. For the three-outcome case with each unit 






=0  ln [Pr ( =  |x z )]
where  is an indicator function.
In our application we have panel data, and we include random unobserved effects - 
and  - in equations (1) and (2), such that
∗ = x
0




γ +  +  (4)
Unlike the usual panel data setting there is no concern of these unobserved effects being
correlated with covariates, as they are not individual specific. However, this innovation
complicates estimation and means that each unit’s  likelihood contributions are no longer
independent, and the likelihood for each  is the product over . These unobserved effects
also need to be integrated out of the likelihood function. We undertake this using simulation
techniques on the (usual) assumption that  ∼  (0 2) and  ∼  (0 2), using Halton
sequences of length 500.
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3 Application
We apply the model to votes cast by Bank of England MPC members at monthly meetings
for the period August 1997 to December 2011 during which two notable empirical regularities
characterized members’ votes.2 First, even with the arrival of new economic information,
members voted to adjust the policy rate infrequently, leading to an observable ‘excess’ of
votes to leave it unchanged. Figure 1 plots members’ vote distribution where the proportion
of no-change votes is markedly larger than votes to raise or decrease the policy rate. Second,
votes to change the policy rate overwhelmingly occur in 25 basis point increments, making
the data well suited for a discrete choice approach. Observed votes are thus classified into
three categories:  = 0 (rate reduction);  = 1 (no-change); and  = 2 (rate increase)
such that the OP component captures votes to lower, leave unchanged, or raise the policy
rate, and the SE captures the propensity to change or not change per se. No-change decisions
can hence arise from each equation.3
OP equation votes are modeled as a function of the Bank’s quarterly modal projections for
inflation and output growth at the eight and four quarter horizons, respectively, modified as
in Goodhart (2005), and expressed in terms of the deviation from the inflation target and an
assumed 24% rate of potential output growth.4 We denote these variables  and GAP,
respectively. The SEmodels the effects of various forms of uncertainty associated with voting
decisions. We include () the uncertainty parameter associated with the MPC’s inflation
forecast at the eight quarter horizon (),
5 proposing that higher values are associated with
a greater reluctance to change rates,6 () an Inflation Report dummy (IR), where a one
denotes an Inflation Report release month (February, May, August, November), and zero
otherwise; we posit that members are more likely to change in these months, as they are
better informed about future economic conditions,7 and () the volatility of the FTSE 100
index for all trading days between scheduled MPC meetings (FTSE), to capture financial
2The government set inflation target changed in January 2004 from 25% RPIX (Retail Price Index,
excluding mortgage interest payments) inflation to 2% CPI (Consumer Price Index) inflation.
3Our data also encompasses the effective zero lower-bound (ZLB) period from June 2009 onwards. As
this period effectively reduces members’ choices to no-change and increase, for this period the option of a
rate reduction vote is removed. Due to the reduced sample size in this period, all relevant parameters are
restricted to be the same both pre- and post-June 2009. However, our estimation results did not change
significantly when the ZLB period was excluded.
4For full details of this construction method see Besley et al. (2008) and Harris and Spencer (2009).
5See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/irprobab.aspx.
6Aoki (2003) finds that as the amount of data uncertainty associated with a variable increases, its infor-
mation content should be discounted. This causes a dampening of the response coefficients in an optimal
policy rule, as a result of the policymaker proceeding more cautiously. Whilst ours is not a theoretical
contribution, we apply similar intuition.
7Revisions to the MPC’s forecasts in non-Inflation Report months provide no substitute for the “complete
reassessment of all the evidence that is involved in a full forecasting round” (Budd (1998), p.1790).
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market uncertainty. Finally there is evidence that internal and external MPC members
exhibit different voting patters at meetings (Gerlach-Kristen, 2009). We thus include a
dummy variable (TYPE) with value one denoting an external member and zero otherwise
in both equations: in the SE it gauges the extent to which these groups differ in their
propensities to change per se; in the OP equation it captures the extent to which members
differ in their propensities to tighten rates relative to loosening them.
Three PIOP variants were estimated: a ‘baseline’ PIOP model without correlated errors
or random unobserved effects (REs); a second model with correlation between the errors
of the OP and SE components (PIOPCOR); and a model with correlated errors and REs in
each of the SE and OP equations (PIOPCRE).
8 Results are presented in Table 1. Other than
TYPE, whose significance diminishes with the introduction of correlated errors and REs,
all variable estimates are significant and robust to these innovations.9 However, with all
our information criteria (AIC, BIC, CAIC) measures identifying PIOPCRE as the preferred
specification, we focus on these results, which are characterized by highly significant random
effects, denoted 2 and 
2
, and correlated errors, . In the OP equation,  and GAP
are statistically significant and correctly signed: positive (negative) values of these variables
increase the probability of a vote for a rate hike (cut). In the SE, the sign on IR indicates
that during Inflation Report months, members are more likely to vote to change rates. FTSE
is positively signed, indicating that changes in interest rates are an increasing function of
financial market volatility.10 Finally,  has the effect of reducing the propensity to change
rates. To demonstrate the model’s usefulness, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of different 
values on the overall probabilities to change rates, holding other variables at:  = 035;
GAP = 01; TYPEOP =TYPESE = 0; FTSE= 18; and IR= 1.
11 For lower values of 
members still vote to raise rates, attributable to the fact that the economy is ‘overheating’
(  0, GAP  0); however, as  increases, the probability of a rate hike falls, such that
for  ≥ 089, a vote to leave rates unchanged is predicted. Thus even if the Bank forecasts
inflation to be above target - which has the effect of increasing the probability of a vote to
increase rates - a vote to leave the policy rate unchanged might still be expected if a high
degree of uncertainty surrounds the inflation forecast itself. Moreover, for  ≥ 089 we have
8All model variants outperformed the basic ordered probit model in terms of AIC, BIC and CAIC.
9Here, unobserved individual heterogeneity may be capturing the time-invariant effect of TYPE. Marginal
effects (not reported due to space constraints) available on request.
10Similar findings were found for other constructed measures of financial market uncertainty, including
‘TED-spread’ type measures and overnight rate volatility. This finding is deserving of further investigation.
11The probability of voting for a rate reduction is not plotted, as in this example the probability of reducing
rates remains close to zero.
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that Pr ( = 1) = max {Pr ( = 0) Pr ( = 1) Pr ( = 2)}, such that in expression (3)
[1− Φ (x0β)]| {z }
SE component
 {Φ2 (x0β − z0γ;−)−Φ2 (x0β−z0γ;−)}| {z }
OP component
 (5)
The above decomposition of the overall decision not to change into its SE and OP components
is shown in Figure 2 using dotted lines: for higher  values the overall probability of
no change is increasingly dominated by the SE. Under such conditions, members may be
construed as opting to ‘wait and see’, voting to change rates when there is more certainty
surrounding the inflation forecast itself. The PIOP model provides a way of modeling such
effects.
4 Conclusion
This paper has extended Harris and Zhao (2007) in a number of directions through proposing
a PIOP model. In our application the model performs well; results suggest the presence of
significant correlation between the SE and OP equations, and also of member-specific unob-
served effects in the two underlying latent equations. Most significantly, we have provided a
possible explanation for why MPC members’ votes are dominated by decisions to leave the
policy rate unchanged; specifically, accounting for such observational equivalence is achieved
through the introduction of two distinct data generating processes. We envisage that such
a generalization to the ZIOP model will be useful in a wide range of applications.
References
Aoki, K. (2003). On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators. Journal of Monetary
Economics 50 (3), 501—523.
Besley, T., N. Meads, and P. Surico (2008). Insiders versus Outsiders in monetary policymaking.
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 98 (2), 218—223.
Budd, A. (1998). The role and operations of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee.
Economic Journal 108, 1783—1794.
Fabiani, S., M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Matha,
R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, and A. Stokman (2006). What firms’ surveys tell us about price-setting
behavior in the euro area. International Journal of Central Banking 2 (3), 3—47.
Gerlach-Kristen, P. (2009). Outsiders at the Bank of England’s MPC. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 41 (6), 1099—1115.
Goodhart, C. (2005). The Monetary Policy Committee’s reaction function: An exercise in estima-
tion. Topics in Macroeconomics 5 (1). Issue 18.
6
Harris, M. and C. Spencer (2009). The policy choices and reaction functions of Bank of England
MPC members. Southern Economic Journal 76 (2), 482—499.
Harris, M. and X. Zhao (2007). Analysis of tobacco consumption in Australia using a zero-inflated














Down No change Up
All members























































OP Equation Pr(No Change)
Overall Pr(Up)
Figure 2: Overall probability of voting to raise rates, no change, and its decomposition as a
function of increasing forecast uncertainty ()
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Table 1: Estimation Results♦
PIOP PIOPCOR PIOPCRE
OP Equation
Constant 0777 (8463)∗∗∗ 0047 (0321)∗∗∗ 0386 (0885)
GAP 0299 (3566)
∗∗∗ 0281 (4148)∗∗∗ 0397 (3745)∗∗∗
 0609 (1276)
∗∗∗ 0516 (1506)∗∗∗ 0597 (8323)∗∗∗
TYPEOP −0340 (3616)∗∗∗ −0099 (1083) −0087 (0154)
 1753 (1351)∗∗∗ 1428 (984)∗∗∗ 1869 (1002)∗∗∗
Splitting Equation (SE)
Constant 04079 (1389) 0706 (2642)∗∗∗ 1434 (1631)
 −01512 (5556)∗∗∗ −0180 (7361)∗∗∗ −0247 (5459)∗∗∗
IR 06895 (5462)∗∗∗ 0352 (3561)∗∗∗ 0406 (1663)∗
FTSE 03814 (6553)∗∗∗ 0416 (6945)∗∗∗ 0462 (4118)∗∗∗
TYPESE 04870 (4207)
∗∗∗ 0470 (4358)∗∗∗ 0343 (0765)
 − 0902 (1320)∗∗∗ 08918 (7363)∗∗∗
2 − − 0550 (3086)∗∗∗
2 − − 0730 (4801)∗∗∗
Summary Statistics
AIC¨ 19338586 19089307 18006215
BIC¨¨ 19972410 19786513 18830186
CAIC¨¨¨ 20072410 19896513 18960186
LogL −9619293 −9489653 −8938108
Sample Proportions and Average Predicted ProbabilitiesF
Down 01873 [02026] 01873 [01965] 01873 [01828]
No change 06827 [06724] 06827 [06766] 06827 [06864]
Up 01300 [01250] 01300 [01269] 01300 [01307]
♦-statistics in parentheses (·). Number of obs. = 1538.
∗∗∗∗∗∗Denotes two-tailed significance at one / five / ten percent levels.
FAverage predicted probabilities in square [·] brackets.
¨Akaike Information Criterion; ¨¨Bayesian Information Criterion;
¨¨¨Consistent Akaike Information Criterion.
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